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    <title>peteg's blog   2007-04-10-GibbardSatterthwaite.autumn</title>
    <link>http://peteg.org/blog</link>
    <description></description>
    <language>en</language>

  <item>
    <title> &lt;a href=&quot;http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gibbard-Satterthwaite_theorem&quot;&gt;Gibbard-Satterthwaite&lt;/a&gt; in &lt;a href=&quot;http://isabelle.in.tum.de/&quot;&gt;Isabelle&lt;/a&gt;.</title>
    <link>http://peteg.org/blog/2007/04/10#2007-04-10-GibbardSatterthwaite</link>
    <category>/choice/social-choice</category>
    <description>
&lt;p&gt;

Finally completed a long-winded proof of the  &lt;a href=&quot;http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gibbard-Satterthwaite_theorem&quot;&gt;Gibbard-Satterthwaite&lt;/a&gt;
theorem in &lt;a href=&quot;http://isabelle.in.tum.de/&quot;&gt;Isabelle&lt;/a&gt;. This is a bit more complex than the proof of &lt;a
href=&quot;http://peteg.org/blog/choice/social-choice/2006-12-12-ArrowsTheorem.autumn&quot;&gt;Arrow's Theorem&lt;/a&gt; because of the requisite ballot manipulations,
though most of the ideas are the same. I followed &lt;a href=&quot;http://peteg.org/blog/choice/social-choice/2006-12-17-Taylor.autumn&quot;&gt;Taylor&lt;/a&gt;
quite closely. Of perhaps more general interest, in Section 3.3: &lt;span
class=&quot;title&quot;&gt;The Equivalence of Arrow's Theorem and the
Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem&lt;/span&gt; he says:

&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;
&lt;p&gt;

In geometry, we can say that two versions of the parallel postulate are
equivalent if each becomes a theorem when the other is added as an axiom to
Euclid's original four. Similarly, we say that two versions of the axiom of
choice are equivalent if each becomes a theorem when the other is added as
an axiom to the Zermello-Frankel axioms for set theory.

&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;

The reasons these assertions have formal content is that the results whose
equivalence is being claimed are independent of the remaining axioms
(assuming the consistency of the remaining axioms). Absent this condition of
independence, the theorem asserting that 2 + 2 = 4 would qualify as being
equivalent to Andrew Wiles' elliptic curve result that settled Fermat's last
theorem (each being provable from the standard axioms of set theory with the
other added &amp;mdash; or not added, as it turns out).

&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;

Equivalence, however, is also used in an informal sense inspired by the
formal notion above. We say that two theorems are equivalent if each is
&quot;easily derivable&quot; from the other, where the ease of the derivation is
measured (intuitively) relative to the difficulty of the stand-alone proofs
of the theorems whose equivalence is being asserted. It is in this informal
sense that we want to ask about the equivalence of Arrow's theorem and the
Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem.

&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/blockquote&gt;

&lt;p&gt;

You'll have to read his book for his conclusions on this very important
topic.

&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;

As it stands I have a grotty proof for the linear-ballots case and hope to
extend it to the non-linear case in the near future.

&lt;/p&gt;</description>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>What would evolution do?</title>
    <link>http://peteg.org/blog/2007/01/07#2007-01-07-BeeVoting</link>
    <category>/choice/social-choice</category>
    <description>
&lt;p&gt;

When the problem gets hard it pays to see what nature does; this, I guess,
is a slightly more abstract reformulation of the &lt;a
href=&quot;http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human-based_computation&quot;&gt;human-based
computation&lt;/a&gt; gambit.

&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;

So, when faced with the apparently impossible task of cooking up decent
voting procedures, what did evolution do? Apparently honeybees engage in a
kind of &lt;a href=&quot;http://rangevoting.org/ApisMellifera.html&quot;&gt;range voting&lt;/a&gt;.

&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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